

Secured MGCP Communication between Voice GW and CUCM via IPsec Based on CA Signed Certificates Configuration Example

TAC

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Introduction

This document describes how to successfully secure Media Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP) signalling between a voice gateway (GW) and CUCM (Cisco Unified Communications Manager) via Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), based on Certificate Authority (CA) signed certificates. In order to set up a secured call via MGCP, signalling and Real–time Transport Protocol (RTP) streams need to be secured separately. It seems to be well documented and quite simple to set up encrypted RTP streams, but a secure RTP stream does not include secure MGCP signalling. If the MGCP signalling is not secured, the encryption keys for the RTP stream are sent in the clear.

Prerequisites

Requirements

Cisco recommends that you have knowledge of these topics:

- MGCP voice gateway registered to CUCM in order to send and receive calls
- Certificate Authority Proxy Function (CAPF) service started, cluster set to mixed–mode
- Cisco IOS® image on GW supports crypto security feature
- Phones and MGCP GW configured for Secure Real–time Transport Protocol (SRTP)

Components Used

The information in this document is based on these software and hardware versions:


- CUCM – single node – runs GGSG (Cisco's Global Government Solutions Group) version 8.6.1.20012-14 in Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) mode
- 7975 phones which run SCCP75-9-3-1SR2-1S
- GW – Cisco 2811 – C2800NM-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M, Version 15.1(4)M8
- E1 ISDN voice card – VWIC2-2MFT-T1/E1 – 2-Port RJ-48 Multiflex Trunk

The information in this document was created from the devices in a specific lab environment. All of the devices used in this document started with a cleared (default) configuration. If your network is live, make sure that you understand the potential impact of any command.

Configure

Note: Use the Command Lookup Tool (registered customers only) in order to obtain more information on the commands used in this section.

Network Diagram



In order to successfully set up IPsec between CUCM and voice GW, complete these steps:

1. Configure the CA on the voice GW and generate a CA-signed certificate for voice GW
2. Generate a CUCM CA-signed IPsec certificate
3. Import CA, CUCM, and voice GW CA certificates on CUCM
4. Configure IPsec tunnel settings on CUCM
5. Configure the IPsec tunnel setting on the voice GW

1. Configure the CA on the Voice GW and Generate a CA-signed Certificate for Voice GW

As a first step, the Rivest-Shamir-Addleman (RSA) key pair needs to be generated on the voice GW (Cisco IOS CA server):

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2#crypto key generate rsa general-keys label IOS_CA exportable
```

Enrollments completed via Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) will be used, so enable the HTTP server:

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2#ip http server
```

In order to configure the CA Server on a gateway, these steps need to be completed:

- a. Set the PKI server name. It needs to be the same name as the key pair generated previously.

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(config)#crypto pki server IOS_CA
```

- b. Specify the location where all database entries will be stored for the CA server.

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(cs-server)#crypto pki server IOS_CA
```

- c. Configure the CA issuer name.

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(cs-server)#issuer-name cn=IOS
```

- d. Specify a certificate revocation list (CRL) distribution point (CDP) to be used in certificates that are issued by the certificate server and enable automatic granting of certificate reenrollment requests for a Cisco IOS subordinate CA server.

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(cs-server)#cdp-url http://209.165.201.10/IOS_CA.crl
```

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(cs-server)#grant auto
```

- e. Enable the CA server.

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(cs-server)#no shutdown
```

The next step is to create a trustpoint for the CA certificate and a local trustpoint for the router certificate with a URL enrollment that points to a local HTTP server:

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(config)#crypto pki trustpoint IOS_CA
```

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(ca-trustpoint)#revocation-check crl
```

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(ca-trustpoint)#rsa keypair IOS_CA
```

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(config)#crypto pki trustpoint local1
```

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(ca-trustpoint)#enrollment url http://209.165.201.10:80
```

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(ca-trustpoint)#serial-number none
```

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(ca-trustpoint)#fqdn none
```

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(ca-trustpoint)#ip-address none
```

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(ca-trustpoint)#subject-name cn=KRK-UC-2x2811-2
```

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(ca-trustpoint)#revocation-check none
```

In order to generate the router's certificate signed by the local CA, the trustpoint needs to be authenticated and enrolled:

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(config)#crypto pki authenticate local1
```

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2(config)#crypto pki enroll local1
```

After that, the router's certificate is generated and signed by the local CA. List the certificate on the router for verification.

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2#show crypto ca certificates
```

```
Certificate
```

```
Status: Available
```

```
Certificate Serial Number (hex): 02
```

```
Certificate Usage: General Purpose
```

```
Issuer:
```

```
cn=IOS
```

```
Subject:
```

```
Name: KRK-UC-2x2811-2
```

```
cn=KRK-UC-2x2811-2
```

```
CRL Distribution Points:
```

```
http://10.48.46.251/IOS_CA.crl
```

```
Validity Date:
```

```
start date: 13:05:01 CET Nov 21 2014
```

```
end date: 13:05:01 CET Nov 21 2015
```


KRK-UC-2x2811-2#crypto pki server IOS_CA request pkcs10 terminal base64
PKCS10 request in base64 or pem

```
% Enter Base64 encoded or PEM formatted PKCS10 enrollment request.
% End with a blank line or "quit" on a line by itself.
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----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quit
% Granted certificate: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```

Note: In order to decode and check the content of the Base64 encoded certificate, enter the *openssl x509 -in certificate.crt -text -noout* command.

The granted CUCM certificate decodes to:

```
Certificate:
  Data&colon:
    Version: 3 (0x2)
    Serial Number: 5 (0x5)
    Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: CN=IOS
    Validity
      Not Before: Jan  8 12:01:00 2015 GMT
      Not After : Jan  8 12:01:00 2016 GMT
    Subject: C=PL, ST=cisco, L=cisco, O=cisco, OU=cisco,
    CN=CUCMB1/serialNumber=56669f92835ffed5084b2915867000f0b669bb7dafa43f3d39aa4d1335e9e253
    Subject Public Key Info:
      Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
      RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
```


y65WzbapZL1S65q+d7BCLQypdrwcKkdS0dfTdKfXEsyWLhecRa8mnZckpgKBk8Ir
Bfm9K+caXkfhPEPa644UzV9++OKMKhtDuQ==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

% General Purpose Certificate:

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

```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=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

The % CA certificate decodes to:

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number: 1 (0x1)

Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: CN=IOS

Validity

Not Before: Nov 21 11:51:12 2014 GMT

Not After : Nov 20 11:51:12 2017 GMT

Subject: CN=IOS

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)

Modulus (1024 bit):

00:ae:82:77:6c:b1:53:2c:2d:6e:00:44:96:46:54:

b0:fe:9e:69:95:6f:e9:87:e9:11:b1:69:b7:2b:7a:

a6:d4:5d:a7:18:23:39:82:37:22:71:0f:df:07:b0:

b6:61:0f:35:e4:c9:2f:cf:9a:fd:6e:cc:0d:47:a6:

9b:7b:7f:36:55:81:3b:a4:f6:9b:d0:69:ea:4d:05:

34:e0:57:30:a7:83:7d:34:aa:38:a1:32:ed:67:cb:

01:27:bf:3d:ba:bc:33:e2:4c:a5:e3:16:cf:cc:67:

31:ba:18:39:be:ba:ad:8f:22:81:91:73:93:5b:51:

3e:52:0c:49:fe:6b:3b:5b:67

Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical

CA:TRUE

X509v3 Key Usage: critical

Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

keyid:94:8B:3F:97:27:3C:BF:1B:20:FE:D5:48:A2:ED:07:A6:75:B2:87:0E

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

94:8B:3F:97:27:3C:BF:1B:20:FE:D5:48:A2:ED:07:A6:75:B2:87:0E

Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption

94:30:2d:52:15:59:52:4d:24:b5:13:16:cc:f6:2d:83:e0:73:

96:62:10:ae:ae:18:9f:a9:35:8b:c4:c3:17:8f:48:f2:9b:6e:

03:a2:a6:7d:d5:a0:cd:1b:55:70:88:9f:d8:bf:88:b8:d2:df:

74:cb:ae:56:cd:b6:a9:64:bd:52:eb:9a:be:77:b0:42:2d:0c:

a9:76:bc:1c:2a:47:52:d1:d7:d3:74:a7:d7:12:cc:96:2e:17:

9c:45:af:26:9d:97:24:a6:02:81:93:c2:2b:05:f3:3d:2b:e7:

1a:5e:47:e1:3c:43:da:eb:8e:14:cd:5f:7e:f8:e2:8c:2a:1b:

43:b9

The % General Purpose Certificate decodes to:

```

Certificate:
  Data&colon;
    Version: 3 (0x2)
    Serial Number: 2 (0x2)
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: CN=IOS
    Validity
      Not Before: Nov 21 12:05:01 2014 GMT
      Not After : Nov 21 12:05:01 2015 GMT
    Subject: CN=KRK-UC-2x2811-2
    Subject Public Key Info:
      Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
      RSA Public Key: (512 bit)
        Modulus (512 bit):
          00:a4:65:88:37:59:c0:02:d2:8b:54:c3:a3:99:95:
          64:40:58:08:f0:ba:c7:0f:ac:d2:ae:56:8a:80:02:
          61:95:4f:87:fe:69:d1:41:0e:6b:aa:2b:48:a5:e9:
          03:74:fa:28:c1:24:fd:47:10:b9:08:99:81:e2:ca:
          53:55:69:18:93
        Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
    X509v3 extensions:
      X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
        URI:http://10.48.46.251/IOS_CA.crl


      X509v3 Key Usage:
        Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
      X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
        keyid:94:8B:3F:97:27:3C:BF:1B:20:FE:D5:48:A2:ED:07:A6:75:B2:87:0E

      X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
        B4:05:9C:EB:52:B9:9D:81:A0:5A:A2:80:88:83:8B:32:5A:61:7E:A2
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
      8c:37:e5:1f:e3:77:c9:cd:d1:ca:40:a2:83:d0:74:68:02:17:
      59:93:e6:6a:a2:c5:f6:ff:51:ef:9c:dc:f9:ff:31:cd:b4:88:
      ce:85:5b:06:19:d4:39:eb:8e:8f:58:67:22:01:f2:c8:c8:de:
      10:b8:d3:12:1e:ae:42:b5:94:37:61:25:5b:5c:a9:7e:6c:64:
      d6:33:79:ab:4b:7e:bd:f7:51:fb:27:a9:4b:4e:29:16:8a:fd:
      46:80:fb:21:68:3a:7b:fd:61:14:31:1e:a7:d8:41:bf:3a:d5:
      c1:01:c2:8f:37:98:d2:b5:6b:3d:c2:e5:db:a9:39:a1:ab:8c:
      c1:3b

```

After they are saved as .pem files, they need to be imported to CUCM. Choose *Cisco Unified OS Administration > Security > Certificate management > Upload Certificate/Certificate*.

- CUCM certificate as IPsec
- Voice GW certificate as IPsec–trust
- CA certificate as IPsec–trust:




4. Configure IPsec Tunnel Settings on CUCM

The next step is configuration of the IPsec tunnel between CUCM and the voice GW. The IPsec tunnel configuration on CUCM is performed via the Cisco Unified OS Administration web page (https://<cucm_ip_address>/cmplatform). Choose **Security > IPSEC Configuration > Add new IPsec policy**.

In this example, a policy called "vgipsecpolicy" was created, with authentication based on certificates. All appropriate information needs to be filled in and correspond to the configuration on the voice GW.

- Status

 Status: Ready

- The system is in FIPS Mode

- IPSEC Policy Details

Policy Group Name*

Policy Name*

Authentication Method*

Peer Type*

Certificate Name

Destination Address*

Destination Port*

Source Address*

Source Port*

Mode*

Remote Port*

Protocol*

Encryption Algorithm*

Hash Algorithm*

ESP Algorithm*

- Phase 1 DH Group

Phase One Life Time*

Phase One DH*

- Phase 2 DH Group

Phase Two Life Time*

Phase Two DH*

- IPSEC Policy Configuration

Enable Policy

Note: The voice gateway certificate name needs to be specified in the Certificate Name field.

5. Configure the IPsec Tunnel Setting on the Voice GW

This example, with inline comments, presents the corresponding configuration on a voice GW.

```

crypto isakmp policy 1      (defines an IKE policy and enters the config-isakmp mode)
  encr aes                 (defines the encryption)
  group 2                  (defines 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman)
  lifetime 57600           (isakmp security association lifetime value)

crypto isakmp identity dn   (defines DN as the ISAKMP identity)
crypto isakmp keepalive 10  (enable sending dead peer detection (DPD)
keepalive messages to the peer)
crypto isakmp aggressive-mode disable (to block all security association
and ISAKMP aggressive mode requests)

crypto ipsec transform-set cm3 esp-aes esp-sha-hmac (set of a combination of
security protocols
and algorithms that are
acceptable for use)

mode transport
crypto ipsec df-bit clear
no crypto ipsec nat-transparency udp-encapsulation

```

```
!  
crypto map cm3 1 ipsec-isakmp      (selects data flows that need security  
processing, defines the policy for these flows  
and the crypto peer that traffic needs to go to)  
  
set peer 209.165.201.10  
set security-association lifetime seconds 28800  
set transform-set cm3  
match address 130  
  
interface FastEthernet0/0  
ip address 209.165.201.20 255.255.255.224  
duplex auto  
speed auto  
crypto map cm3      (enables creypto map on the interface)  
  
access-list 130 permit ip host 209.165.201.20 host 209.165.201.10
```

Verify

Use this section in order to confirm that your configuration works properly.

Verify IPsec Tunnel Status on the CUCM End

The fastest way to verify the IPsec tunnel status on CUCM is go to the OS Administration page and use the *ping* option under Services > Ping. Ensure the *Validate IPsec* check box is checked. Obviously, the IP address specified here is the IP address of the GW.

Note: See these Cisco bug IDs for information on the validation of the IPsec tunnel via the ping feature on CUCM:

- Cisco bug ID CSCuo53813 – Validate IPsec Ping results blank when ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) packets are sent
- Cisco bug ID CSCud20328 – Validate IPsec Policy shows incorrect error message in FIPS mode

Verify the IPsec Tunnel Status on the Voice Gateway End

In order to verify whether the setup runs fine or not, it needs to be confirmed that the Security Associations (SAs) for both layers (Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) and IPsec) are created properly.

In order to check if the SA for ISAKMP is created and works correctly, enter the *show crypto isakmp sa* command on the GW.

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2#show crypto isakmp sa
IPv4 Crypto ISAKMP SA
dst                src                state              conn-id status
209.165.201.20    209.165.201.10    QM_IDLE           1539 ACTIVE

IPv6 Crypto ISAKMP SA
```

Note: The proper status for the SA should be ACTIVE and QM_IDLE.

The second layer is SAs for IPsec. Their status can be verified with the *show crypto ipsec sa* command.

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2#show crypto ipsec sa
```

```
interface: FastEthernet0/0
  Crypto map tag: cm3, local addr 209.165.201.20

protected vrf: (none)
local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (209.165.201.20/255.255.255.255/0/0)
remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (209.165.201.10/255.255.255.255/0/0)
current_peer 209.165.201.10 port 500
  PERMIT, flags={origin_is_acl,}
  #pkts encaps: 769862, #pkts encrypt: 769862, #pkts digest: 769862
  #pkts decaps: 769154, #pkts decrypt: 769154, #pkts verify: 769154
  #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
  #pkts not compressed: 0, #pkts compr. failed: 0
  #pkts not decompressed: 0, #pkts decompress failed: 0
  #send errors 211693, #recv errors 0

local crypto endpt.: 209.165.201.20, remote crypto endpt.: 209.165.201.10
path mtu 1500, ip mtu 1500, ip mtu idb FastEthernet0/0
current outbound spi: 0xA9FA5FAC(2851757996)
PFS (Y/N): N, DH group: none

inbound esp sas:
  spi: 0x9395627(154752551)
    transform: esp-aes esp-sha-hmac ,
    in use settings ={Transport, }
    conn id: 3287, flow_id: NETGX:1287, sibling_flags 80000006, crypto map: cm3
    sa timing: remaining key lifetime (k/sec): (4581704/22422)
    IV size: 16 bytes
    replay detection support: Y
    Status: ACTIVE

inbound ah sas:

inbound pcp sas:

outbound esp sas:
  spi: 0xA9FA5FAC(2851757996)
    transform: esp-aes esp-sha-hmac ,
    in use settings ={Transport, }
    conn id: 3288, flow_id: NETGX:1288, sibling_flags 80000006, crypto map: cm3
    sa timing: remaining key lifetime (k/sec): (4581684/22422)
    IV size: 16 bytes
    replay detection support: Y
    Status: ACTIVE

outbound ah sas:

outbound pcp sas:
KRK-UC-2x2811-2#
```

Note: Inbound and outbound Security Policy Indexes (SPIs) should be created in status ACTIVE, and counters for number of packets encapsulated/decapsulated and encrypted/decrypted should grow every time any traffic via a tunnel is generated.

The last step is to confirm that the MGCP GW is in the registered state and the TFTP configuration was downloaded properly from CUCM without any failures. This can be confirmed from the output of these commands:

```
KRK-UC-2x2811-2#show ccm-manager
MGCP Domain Name: KRK-UC-2x2811-2.cisco.com
Priority          Status          Host
```

```

=====
Primary          Registered          209.165.201.10
First Backup     None
Second Backup    None

Current active Call Manager: 10.48.46.231
Backhaul/Redundant link port: 2428
Failover Interval: 30 seconds
Keepalive Interval: 15 seconds
Last keepalive sent: 09:33:10 CET Mar 24 2015 (elapsed time: 00:00:01)
Last MGCP traffic time: 09:33:10 CET Mar 24 2015 (elapsed time: 00:00:01)
Last failover time: None
Last switchback time: None
Switchback mode: Graceful
MGCP Fallback mode: Not Selected
Last MGCP Fallback start time: None
Last MGCP Fallback end time: None
MGCP Download Tones: Disabled
TFTP retry count to shut Ports: 2

Backhaul Link info:
  Link Protocol: TCP
  Remote Port Number: 2428
  Remote IP Address: 209.165.201.10
  Current Link State: OPEN
  Statistics:
    Packets recvd: 0
    Recv failures: 0
    Packets xmitted: 0
    Xmit failures: 0
  PRI Ports being backhauled:
    Slot 0, VIC 1, port 0

FAX mode: disable
Configuration Error History:
KRK-UC-2x2811-2#

KRK-UC-2x2811-2#show ccm-manager config-download
Configuration Error History:
KRK-UC-2x2811-2#

```

Troubleshoot

This section provides information you can use in order to troubleshoot your configuration.

Troubleshoot the IPsec Tunnel on the CUCM End

On CUCM there is no Serviceability service responsible for IPsec termination and management. CUCM uses a Red Hat IPsec tools package built in to the operating system. The daemon that runs on Red Hat Linux and terminates IPsec connection is OpenSwan.

Every time the IPsec policy is enabled or disabled on CUCM (OS Administration > Security > IPSEC Configuration), the Openswan daemon is restarted. This can be observed in the Linux messages log. A restart is indicated by these lines:

```

Nov 16 13:50:17 cucmipsec daemon 3 ipsec_setup: Stopping Openswan IPsec...
Nov 16 13:50:25 cucmipsec daemon 3 ipsec_setup: ...Openswan IPsec stopped
(...)
Nov 16 13:50:26 cucmipsec daemon 3 ipsec_setup: Starting Openswan IPsec
U2.6.21/K2.6.18-348.4.1.el5PAE...
Nov 16 13:50:32 cucmipsec daemon 3 ipsec_setup: ...Openswan IPsec started

```

Every time there is a problem with the IPsec connection on CUCM, the last entries in the messages log should be checked (enter the *file list activelog syslog/messages** command) in order to confirm that Openswan is up and runs. If Openswan runs and started with no errors, you can troubleshoot the IPsec setup. The daemon responsible for the set up of IPsec tunnels in Openswan is Pluto. Pluto logs are written in order to secure logs on Red Hat, and they can be gathered via the *file get activelog syslog/secure.** command or via **RTMT: Security Logs**.

Note: More information on how to gather logs via the RTMT can be found in the RTMT documentation.

If it is difficult to determine the source of the problem based on these logs, IPsec can be verified further by the Technical Assistance Center (TAC) via root on the CUCM. After you access CUCM via root, information and logs about the IPsec status can be checked with these commands:

```
ipsec verify (used to identify the status of Pluto daemon and IPsec)
ipsec auto --status
ipsec auto --listall
```

There is also an option to generate a Red Hat sosreport via root. This report contains all the information required by Red Hat support in order to troubleshoot further problems on the operating system level:

```
sosreport -batch - output file will be available in /tmp folder
```

Troubleshoot the IPsec Tunnel on the Voice Gateway End

On this site, you can troubleshoot all phases of IPsec tunnel setup after you enable these debug commands:

```
debug crypto ipsec
debug crypto isakmp
```

Note: Detailed steps to troubleshoot IPsec are found in IPsec Troubleshooting: Understanding and Using debug Commands.

You can troubleshoot MGCP GW problems with these debug commands:

```
debug ccm-manager config download all
debug ccm-manager backhaul events
debug ccm-manager backhaul packets
debug ccm-manager errors
debug ccm-manager events
debug mgcp packet
debug mgcp events
debug mgcp errors
debug mgcp state
debug isdn q931
```